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Abstract
This paper argues that the evolution of social policy – vulgo: labor market mandates – 
in the European Union seems to follow a set path. Intervals of activism have been 
followed by challenges and checks to its development, but Treaty innovations (inter 
al.) have provided the impetus for further activism. The classic and first case in point 
was the Single European Act (1976), which presaged a new bout of legislation by 
widening the reach of qualified majority voting. The next was Maastricht, or the 
Treaty on European Union (1991) and the Agreement on Social Policy, which for the 
first time established a firm basis for social policy. An intermediate but instructive 
step was passage of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) which formally incorporated the 
latter into the main body of the treaty rather than leaving it as a Protocol appended to 
the treaty, The most recent instance is the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, which was to morph into the Reform (or Lisbon) Treaty of December 2007. 
This agreement portends more fundamental reforms for two reasons. First, it implies 
new legislation in the area of labor relations (issues such as pay determination, the 
rights to strike/lockout, and the right of association) previously expressly excluded 
from social policy. Second, it will test some member states applying European law, 
which means that theoretical opt outs may be just that. And, if history is any guide, 
there will be subsequent consolidation  to  bring the labor  standards set under 
legislation into line with European Court of Justice decisions and a further ratcheting-
up of standards. 
†A first draft of this paper was first presented at the 77
th Annual Meeting of the 
Southern Economic Association, New Orleans, November 19-21, 2007 to anchor the 
session  European Social Policy and Other Mandates. The author thanks without 
implicating session participants for their comments.I. Introduction 
We are now in the fifth phase of social policy in the European Union. The most recent 
phase associated with the abortive  Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 
cannot be understood in isolation of the preceding phases. Indeed, in seeing distinct 
connections between the various phases, we shall argue that it is déjà vu all over gain 
or, in more measured fashion, that history casts a long shadow in matters concerning 
the erection of a plinth of worker rights at European level. Since neither the 
institutions nor the phases of labor market regulation are well known to U.S. 
observers, our discussion is primarily descriptive. (For a formal economic analysis of 
the economics of mandates, see Addison, Barrett and Siebert, 2006; Addison and 
Hirsch, 1997).  
Our presentation proceeds as follows. We first outline the various phases of 
policy, concluding with an interpretation of the most recent phase. In a summary, we 
draw together the threads of our discussion and assess the likely evolution of policy. 
Our evaluation is altogether more pessimistic than that of American commentators 
such as Krueger (2000), who offers a blanket market failure argument by way of 
justification for all sorts of labor mandates, or European observers such as Adnett and 
Hardy (2005) who see policy as becoming more pragmatic and steadily modernizing 
(via the substitution of soft law for hard law) to allow accommodation to local needs.  
II. The Phases of Social Policy
Phase 1. The 1974 Social Action Plan
The first phase can be traced back to October 1972 when a summit meeting of the 
heads of state of the member nations of the European Community (the European 
Council) gave support to a “vigorous” social policy having the same importance as the 
achievement of economic union. In response, the European Commission – the body 
responsible for proposing Community legislation – put forward an ambitious social 
action plan  that proposed mandates in the areas of health and safety at work, 
minimum wages, working hours, employee participation, and the hiring of contract 
labor   (Commission,   1974).   The   European   Council   of   Ministers,   the   agency 
responsible for discussing and approving Community legislation (but see below) 
issued a Resolution that endorsed the action plan while cautioning that a standard 
2solution to all social problems should not be attempted and that the “subsidiarity” 
principle be respected. The Resolution amounted to a declaration of general principles 
but it provided a foundation for Community social policy, taken in conjunction with 
Articles 117 and 100 of the Treaty of Rome.
1 
What was the result? The Commission, strictly DG-V, achieved some early 
success. Thus, each of its proposals to strengthen job rights in the event of collective 
redundancies, transfers of undertakings, and firm insolvencies were adopted in 
Council/enacted into law between 1975 and 1980. Somewhat more substantive equal 
opportunities legislation was also passed that extended the definition of equal pay 
contained in Article 119 of the Rome Treaty. Similarly, substantial progress was made 
in the area of health and safety despite the absence of any treaty basis for such 
intervention: between 1978 and 1987, some 11 such directives were adopted in 
Council.
2 (We should note here that Article 118(1) of the Single European Act marks 
the introduction of a firm treaty basis for health and safety measures, while Article 
118A(2) provides for qualified  majority voting in Council in respect of such 
measures.) 
That said, prior to the Single European Act (SEA), which delineates the 
second   phase   of   Community   social   policy,   the   Commission’s   successes   were 
overshadowed by its failures. No progress was made on its proposals dealing with 
employee rights to information, consultation and participation (in ascending order of 
intervention,  the Vredeling  initiative,  1980/83; the European Company Statute, 
1970/1975; and the draft Fifth Directive on Company Law, 1983). Similarly, impasse 
was reached on its proposals seeking equal treatment of part-timers with full-timers as 
regards working conditions, dismissal protection, and occupational security schemes 
in 1982/83, on its attempt to place curbs on the operation of temporary employment 
agencies in 1982, and its initiative seeking 3 months parental leave in 1983/84. 
In all these cases, if not health and safety per se, the Commission’s proposals 
strayed too far from national practice, and not just that of the United Kingdom.
Phase 2. The Social Charter
In an attempt to facilitate completion of the internal market (i.e. economic integration) 
the United Kingdom conceded ground in the issue of qualified majority voting 
(QMV) in Council. The unintended consequence was that it would now be easier to 
pass social legislation by undercutting the British veto. Strictly speaking, the SEA 
3only provided for QMV on matters of health and safety under Article 118A. Also the 
thrust of the SEA like that of the Treaty of Rome remained distinctly economic.
3
Just two years after the implementation of the SEA, the Commission was to 
issue in December 1989 a solemn proclamation of fundamental social rights: the so-
called social charter. The social charter was not binding on its signatories (and in fact 
the United Kingdom refused to endorse it), but it was accompanied by a detailed 
social action program which contained no less than 47 separate initiatives, some 23 of 
which  were to be the subject of binding legislation (see Addison and Siebert, 1991, 
1994).  
Draft   legislation   swiftly   followed,   the   hallmark   of   which   was   the 
Commission’s creative use of the health and safety criterion under article 118A. 
Examples included directives on the 48-hour maximum working week, pregnant 
workers, and child labor. These measures had no well determined link with health and 
safety and insofar as they dealt with “the rights and interests of employed persons” 
seemed to be directly undercut by another provision of the SEA (viz. Article 100A) 
requiring unanimity.
A   list   of   the   principal   social   charter   initiatives   in   ascending   order   of 
controversy is as follows:
1. Two council decisions on measures to assist the elderly (adopted); 
2. Modifications to existing Community vocational training programs for young 
people and employment information systems (adopted);
3. A slew of 11 health and safety initiatives, mostly rooted in the pre-social charter 
health   and   safety   framework   directive   83/391/EEC   that   noted   inter   al.   that 
improvements in safety, hygiene, and health at work were not to be subordinated to 
purely economic considerations (all adopted with one exception relating to chemical 
agents at work that was only adopted in April 1998);
4. An atypical workers (health and safety) directive requiring agency workers and 
those on fixed-tern contracts to be informed of job risks and trained appropriately 
(adopted);
5. Modifications of the earlier directive on collective redundancies (adopted);
6. Employers duty to inform employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or 
employment relation (adopted);
7. Protection of young people at work, basically seeking to ban child labor (adopted, 
with transitional relief to the United Kingdom);
8. Posted workers directive guaranteeing host country conditions to posted workers 
(adopted);
9. Pregnant workers directive providing maternity leave, dismissal protection, and 
preservation of employment rights, and provision of risk assessments (adopted);
10. Working Time Directive establishing the 48-hour week, rest periods, annual paid 
leave, and regulating night work (adopted, although the United Kingdom abstained 
4from the vote in Council and unsuccessfully challenged the treaty basis of the 
directive);
11. Two further atypical worker draft directives extending to part-timers and fixed-
term contract workers comparable working conditions to those enjoyed by full timers 
and providing such employees (and agency workers) with the same  protection under 
statutory and social security provisions as full timers (deadlocked);
12. European Works Councils (withdrawn and processed under the Agreement on 
Social Policy).
On balance, the Commission had secured most of its objectives, even if it had 
to compromise on items 5, 9 and 10 in particular. But it continued to be frustrated by 
British opposition and sought a way out.
Phase 3. The Agreement on Social Policy and Two-Track Social Europe
During the 1991 intergovernmental negotiations leading up to the revision of the 
treaties establishing the common market, the Commission sought to extend the reach 
of social policy and to widen the treaty basis permitting qualified majority voting 
beyond the tenuous hold of Article 118A. To this end it proposed a special social 
chapter to the new treaty – the Treaty on European Union, or Maastricht Treaty as it is 
more popularly known.
The opposition of the United Kingdom meant that a political compromise was 
necessary to save the wider treaty. The formula was to relegate the terms of what 
would have been the social chapter to a Protocol on Social Policy appended to the 
Treaty on European Union of 1991. Annexed to the Protocol was an Agreement on 
Social Policy. The Protocol was signed by all (the then) 12 member states and noted 
the intention of eleven of their number to use the machinery of the Community to 
implement an Agreement on Social Policy that specifically excluded the United 
Kingdom.
The two key innovations of the Agreement on Social Policy pertain to treaty 
basis and the social dialogue process.
4 Crucially, the Agreement confirms and clarifies 
the legal competence of the Community in matters of social policy while extending 
the basis of QMV.  Thus, Article 2 of the Agreement on Social Policy sets down five 
areas   where   QMV   would   apply,   and   another   five   areas   requiring   unanimity. 
Specifically, QVM is permitted for measures dealing with (a) improvement in the 
working environment to protect workers health and safety, (2) working conditions, (3) 
the information and consultation rights of workers, (4) gender equality, and (5) the 
integration of workers excluded from the labor market. Unanimity would still be 
5required for measures concerning social security, dismissals protection, freedom of 
association, conditions of employment for third-country nationals resident in the 
Community, and financial contributions for the promotion of manpower instruments.
5
The upshot was that were now to be two sets of rules governing social policy 
in the new EU: the standard treaty route under which Commission proposals would be 
processed before all member states (15 with the accession of Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden in January 1995) and the Agreement on Social Policy route before the 
reduced Council of 11 (14) member states.
The second key component of the Agreement on Social Policy was the role 
reserved for the two sides of industry at European level/social partners: at that time 
the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE), the 
European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation (CEEP) and the European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).
6  Under Article 3 of the Agreement, prior to 
submitting proposals in the social policy field, the Commission had to consult the 
social partners on the possible direction of Community action. Following such 
consultation, if the Commission decided to pursue legislation, it had again to consult 
them on the proposed details. At any stage in these second-stage negotiations the 
social partners could inform the Commission that they would like to negotiate on the 
issue.   At   their   joint   request,   any   resulting   framework   agreements   could   be 
implemented (i.e. given the force of law) by a Council decision following on a 
proposal from the Commission. 
While not eschewing the standard treaty route, it soon became clear that the 
Agreement on Social Policy was to be used by the Commission to attend to unfinished 
business. In the summer of 1994, just prior to the first application of the Agreement, 
of the 26 binding measures stemming from the social charter no less than 18 had been 
enacted into law, another 4 were close to passage, and just three – the two proposals 
on atypical work and the draft directive on transnational works councils in European-
scale organizations – remained deadlocked in Council. There were also a number of 
other draft directives left over from the earlier social action plan (most obviously, 
those dealing with systems of worker participation).
The first use of the Agreement was the controversial draft legislation on 
European Works Councils. This was also the first occasion on which the social 
partners tried to negotiate their own accord. When the latter proved abortive, the 
Commission stepped in and issued its own proposals which were adopted by  the 
6reduced Council in September 1994 (OJ L254 of 30.9.94). But the social partners 
were able to reach their own framework agreement on parental leave in December 
1995 (OJ L145 of 19.6.96) and on part-time work in May 1997 (OJ L14 of 20.1.98). 
That said, no framework agreement could be reached on a number of other issues
7 and 
it looked as if the process of social dialogue might be fatally compromised in March 
1998 when UNICE pulled out of discussions on the subject of worker information and 
consultation at national level. Nevertheless, a framework agreement on fixed-term 
(but not agency) contracts was jointly reached in February 1999 (OJ L175 of 10.7.99).
8
Finally, during this third phase of policy, the Commission was to process a 
number of social charter and other proposals through the standard treaty route. 
Adopted legislation – in addition to the long-delayed posted workers’ directive  noted 
earlier – included a measure providing equal treatment for men and women in 
occupational social security schemes (OJ L46 of 17.2.97), and amending earlier 
legislation; an initiative safeguarding worker rights in the event of business transfers 
(OJ L201 of 17.7.98), replacing earlier legislation in the light of evolving case law; a 
consolidating collective redundancies directive (OJ L225 of 12.8.98); and a measure 
safeguarding the supplementary pension rights of employed  and self-employed 
persons   moving   within   the   Community   (OJ   L209   of   25.7.98).   Further,   the 
Commission  proposed  legislation   on   worker   involvement   attendant   upon   the 
formation of the European Company (OJ C138 of 25.9.91), a measure that dated back 
to 1970, as well as two directives seeking to extend the 1993 working time directive 
to  hitherto excluded sectors and to the road haulage industry (see OJC249 of 1.9.99 
and OCJ43 of 7.2.99, respectively).
In sum, this phase of social policy contains few truly new binding initiatives 
and patently lacks the detail of the social charter’s action program. Instead, policy was 
to be guided by a “rolling action plan,” designed to be added to as circumstances 
changed and in the light of perceived needs (see Commission, 1995). The lack of 
detail   reflects   European   preoccupations   with   unemployment   and   reduced 
competitiveness on the one hand and the certain revision of Community competence 
in matters of social policy attendant upon the deliberations of the intergovernmental 
conference on changes to the treaties establishing the Community.  
As a postscript, the appearance of two-track social Europe was to prove short 
lived. Within a month of the election of New Labour in May 1997, the United 
7Kingdom was to opt in to the Agreement on Social Policy, which was to become part 
and parcel of the new treaty.
Phase 4. The Long March: The Treaty of Amsterdam, the Social Chapter, the Open 
Method of Coordination and Modernization
The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, incorporated the provisions of the Agreement on 
Social Policy directly into the main body of the Treaty.
9 It had therefore become a 
Social Chapter after all. But the new treaty did not become effective until May 1999. 
In the interstices, to extend directives to the United Kingdom, the Commission 
readopted the Agreement on Social Policy legislation on a whole Community basis 
(under Article 100). In this way, the EWC directive, the social partners’ framework 
agreement on parental leave and on part-time work, as well as the burden of proof in 
sex discrimination cases were all extended to the United Kingdom in advance of 
treaty ratification. (Most of the other legislative adoptions in the second half of 1998 
have already been discussed under Phase 3.)
Immediately  after  treaty  ratification,   the  most  important  proposal being 
processed through the social chapter route concerned draft legislation on a general 
framework for informing and consulting employees. Although at this time there were 
already a number of pieces of legislation in place covering worker information and 
consultation – namely, directives on collective redundancies, transfers of business, 
European Works Councils, and the provisions for worker participation implicit in the 
plethora of Community health and safety measures) the Commission had enjoyed 
little success in its flagship employee involvement proposals.  Thus, it will be recalled 
that the deliberations on the European Company Statute (ECS) and the Fifth Company 
Law Directive proceeded along the social charter initiatives but were not part of that 
legislative   agenda.   They   foundered   partly   because   of   British   opposition   (the 
voluntaristic   tradition)   and   material   diversity   among   member   states   in   their 
procedures for informing and consulting workers.
In its medium-term action program, the Commission (1995a) had suggested 
that Vredeling would be withdrawn in the wake of the European Works Council 
(EWC) Directive, while a subsequent Commission (1995b) communication indicated 
that it favored a single new instrument on ways of consulting workers at national level 
to complement the transnational provisions of the EWC directive. As we shall see, the 
path was to be tortuous.
8The Commission had launched consultations with the social partners in June 
1997 on the subject of possible Community action on worker involvement and 
consultation. The timing as is usual with controversial Commission initiatives is no 
accident. It followed on the Vilvoorde incident, publication of the Davignon (1997) 
report into worker participation, and the election of New Labour in Britain.  Davignon 
focused solely on the ECS. It recommended that companies setting up as a European 
Company voluntarily negotiate a form of participation with their unions. A default 
would apply in the form of standardized procedures The Davignon Report was 
incorporated as a (revised) ECS text on worker information and consultation and 
discussed in Council in October and again in December 1997. But both board 
representation and the default proved controversial, and despite progress attendant 
upon the insertion of a zero participation option and the removal of the guarantee of 
board representation the measure remained stuck in Council until the end of the social 
action program 1998-2000. 
Besides, because of its voluntary nature – companies had first to elect to 
become a European Company – the ECS was of limited help to the goal of 
harmonizing national systems of informing and consulting workers. The Commission 
sought to pursue harmonization because of the alleged weaknesses of national 
mechanisms of informing and consulting workers, the need to avoid distortions of 
competition, while supposedly increasing the competitiveness of firms, as well as the 
need to render existing systems more transparent and consistent. Following UNICE’s 
decision not to proceed with a European-level agreement, the Commission issued its 
own proposals in November 1998 but the measure was not to be discussed in Council 
for almost two years.
But our narrative is running ahead of some other key developments. An 
important social policy innovation in the Treaty of Amsterdam was a new chapter 
(Title VIII) dealing with employment. It set a high level of employment as a central 
objective   of   the   Community   and   committed   member   states   to   developing   a 
coordinated strategy for employment and particularly for promoting a skilled, trained 
and adaptable workforce and labor markets responsive to economic change. The goal 
was to be facilitated by Community measures to supplement the actions of member 
states. The European Council was to review the employment situation annually and 
reach conclusions on the basis of a joint annual report issued by the Council and the 
Commission. Acting on a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, the 
9Council was to formulate guidelines that were to be taken into account by member 
states in drawing up their own employment policies. They had to furnish the Council 
with annual reports on the implementation of their national employment policies in 
the light of the Council’s guidelines. And the Council could in turn make nonbinding 
Recommendations to the member states on their performance, again by QMV on a 
recommendation from the Commission. It could also adopt incentive measures to 
facilitate cooperation among member states (such as comparative analyses and pilot 
projects). Initially, four Commission guidelines (rather than targets) were accepted by 
Council: the promotion of a culture of entrepreneurship (e.g. more self employment 
and new business start-ups); the creation of a culture of employability (ensuring inter 
al. that each unemployed  adult (young) worker was offered a job, training, retraining, 
work experience, or other employment assistance within the first 12 (6) months of 
becoming unemployed; the promotion of adaptability (i.e. accommodating to flexible 
work arrangements with no loss of employment security; and the strengthening of 
equal opportunities by raising female participation rates via career breaks, parental 
leave, and the like.
Note that unlike the other terms of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which would not 
be activated until ratification (May 1999), action pursuant to this employment chapter 
was immediate. Employment policy had moved the top of the European agenda. 
(Given the hiatus over employee involvement, the only other major ongoing initiative 
at this time was the extension of the 1993 working time directive, consultations on 
which had – as noted earlier – begun in 1997 before the treaty was signed.).
10  
The employment chapter was followed up by the Luxembourg jobs summit to 
discuss the employment situation in November 1997. This led to a revised set of 
guidelines on employment policy in the following year and to a new social action 
program for 1998-2000 (Commission, 1998). Like its immediate predecessor, the 
social action program is pretty thin on detail. Three principal lines of action are 
outlined. The first covers jobs, skills and mobility, where the employment chapter is 
seen by the Commission as very much the central plank of social policy. It refers to 
the introduction of a new generation of education and training programs, inter al. The 
more substantive themes covered under the second heading of the changing world of 
work concern the organization of work and the “anticipation of industrial change.” 
Under the first heading the broad aim is to secure proper training, the development of 
new forms of contractual relationships, and career paths that are consistent with job 
10security (employment continuity, social security coverage, and training opportunities, 
and the promotion of worker adaptability/motivation through increased involvement. 
Apart from the extension of the working time directive, the measures anticipated 
include consultation with the social partners on the protection of teleworkers, the 
encouragement   of   financial   participation,   and   new   guidelines   on   member-state 
training measures. For its part, the anticipation of industrial change encompasses such 
measures as the preparation by large companies of a  managing change  report 
providing information on what structural changes are foreseen and how they will be 
managed,   underscoring   the   responsibility   of   companies   for   maintaining   the 
employability of their workers, coupled with sanctions for companies that dismiss 
workers without having taken the necessary steps to safeguard this employability, and 
legislation on the adoption of minimum standards for informing and consulting 
workers. The third major theme is an  inclusive society. Here the Commission’s 
proposals   are   more   conventional   and   they   include   the   modernization   and 
improvement of social protection schemes together with a raft of actions geared to the 
achievement of gender equality and the implementation of an action plan against 
racism.
If the Luxembourg jobs summit of November 1997 launched the European 
Employment Strategy (EES) or Luxembourg process (i.e. coordination of member 
states’ employment strategies) on the basis of the new Treaty’s employment chapter, a 
better-known summit rooted in the EES was that held in Lisbon in March 2000. The 
Lisbon summit sought to make the European Union the most competitive economy in 
the world while achieving full employment by 2010.  Alesina and Perotti (2004, p. 7) 
refer to the Lisbon summit as having a “quasi-mythical status” in Europe because of 
the   lofty   goals   set   for   the   employment   rate,   the   prevention   of   long-tern 
unemployment, participation rates in active labor market programs, and so on.  These 
targets were to be achieved via the open method of coordination created as part of the 
employment policy and the Luxembourg process, namely, an annual program of 
planning, monitoring, examination, and readjustment. The process thus involves 
employment guidelines, national action plans, a joint employment report summarizing 
those action plans, and country-specific recommendations in Council based on QMV. 
This OMC is represented as a “soft” law approach to EU social policy as 
opposed to the “hard” approach of Council directives and recommendations as a 
means of delivering social policy agendas (e.g. Adnett and Hardy, 2005, p. 15). But 
11note the use of numerical targets in the guidelines and the prescription of controversial 
policies as self-evident goods. Further note that the hard law approach of binding 
instruments has not been abandoned by the Commission. 
The Lisbon summit emphasized that people were Europe’s main asset and 
should be the focal point of the EU’s policies, such that the knowledge-based 
economy which it wholeheartedly embraced did not exacerbate existing problems of 
unemployment, social exclusion, and poverty. It also stated that the European social 
model had to underpin the transformation to the knowledge economy. In the process 
the model had to be adapted and modernized. 
 The Commission social policy agenda for the years 2000-2005 (Commission, 
2000) is intimately lined to the Lisbon summit on which it seeks to build. It refers to 
the need to “ensure the positive and dynamic interaction of economic, employment, 
and social policy, and to forge a political agreement which mobilizes all key actors to 
work jointly towards the new strategic goal” (p. 6) and “to harness the full benefits of 
change while managing its disadvantages” (p. 5). The document identifies a number 
of objectives, including full employment and the quality of work; the quality of social 
policy;   and   the   promotion   of   equality   in   industrial   relations.   Its   legislative 
commitments include completion/codification of Community legislation on working 
time; adoption of the ECS and its proposals for the national-level consultation of 
workers; codification and simplification of health and safety legislation; adoption of 
measures on social security for migrant workers and on the freedom of movement for 
workers; a proposal on the transferability of supplementary pensions; and a variety of 
initiatives on equal treatment and the outlawing of discrimination. Not surprisingly. a 
key role is reserved for the social dialogue partners in the entire process. Key themes 
set for action under social dialogue include lifetime learning, continued consultation 
on   the   modernization   of   employment   relations,   consultations   with   a   view   to 
establishing at European level voluntary mechanisms on mediation, arbitration, and 
conciliation in respect of conflict resolution, negotiations on issues related to the 
organization of work, investigation of the contribution of the social partners to the 
modernization and improvement of social protection, as well as their   sustained 
engagement in the areas of equal pay, gender desegregation, and the eradication of 
discrimination  at the workplace.
This   is   hardly   an   empty   agenda   as   is   perhaps   made   evident   by   the 
Commission’s phrase  social policy as a productive factor. Note also that the 
12Commission as in previous action programs firmly commits itself to the promotion of 
international cooperation by ratifying the ILO convention on child labor, supporting 
the debate on respect for core labor standards via a dialogue with the ILO and the 
WTO, and generally developing cooperation with international organizations in the 
field of social protection and fundamental social rights.
What   policies   were   adopted   in   this   five   year-period,   marked   by   the 
appointment of a new Commission. The early years were to be sure characterized by a 
flurry of adoptions. The major adoptions in 2000 were the   horizontal directive 
extending the provisions of the working time directive to excluded sectors and 
activities (Directive 2000/34/EC; OJ L303/16 of 27.11.200), together with a directive 
implementing the social partners’ agreement on working time in civil aviation 
(Directive   2000/79/EC;   OJ   L   302/57   of   1.12.2000);   a   measure   on   minimum 
requirements for improving the safety and health protection of workers potentially at 
risk from explosive atmospheres (OJ L23/57 of 28.1.2000) and a directive codifying 
the 1990 directive on the protection of workers from risks related to exposure to 
biological agents at work (OJ L262/21 of 17.10.2000); and no less than three separate 
discrimination initiatives, namely, a directive implementing the principle of equal 
treatment regardless of racial or ethnic origin (OJ L180/22 of 19.7.2000), a directive 
implementing the principle of equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 
L303/16 of 2.12.2000), and a Council decision on establishing a community action 
program to  combat  discrimination  (OJ l303/23  of 2.12.2000). These measures 
considerably   broadened   Community   anti-discrimination   legislation   which   had 
previously been largely restricted to sex discrimination.
But if 2000 was marked by legislative activism 2001 was to prove a banner 
year for the Commission. This was principally by virtue of consensus reached in 
Council on the worker involvement provisions of the ECS (actually reached in 
December 2000), some three decades after the issue was first debated in Council, and 
real progress on a number of other important initiatives, most notably a conciliated 
text on the proposed directive establishing a general framework for informing and 
consulting workers (see below). Actual legislation was confined to consolidation of 
the 1977 transfer of undertakings directive (2001/23/EC of 12.3.2001) and a health 
and safety directive on the use of work equipment at work (OJ L195/46 of 19.7.2001).
2002 saw the adoption of legislation establishing a general framework for 
informing and consulting employees (OJ L80/35 of 23.3.2002), a little under 4 years 
13after it was first mooted. In common with the ECS a number of significant 
modifications had been made to the draft legislation over the course of its history –  in 
this case, most notably with regard to sanctions for non-compliance and longer 
transposition intervals for smaller companies in countries without statutory systems of 
employee involvement. The legislation applies to undertakings employing at least 50 
employees  in  any  one  member  state  or establishments  employing   at  least 20 
employees in one member state (at the discretion of the member state). While 
allowing flexibility as to institutional form, the directive requires that information 
should cover the recent and probable development of the unit’s activities and 
economic situation, information and consultation on the employment situation and its 
structure, including any measures contemplated for dealing with threatened job loss, 
and information and consultation on decisions likely to produce major changes in 
work organization and contractual relations.  Collective agreements could vary the 
content of information and consultation. More generous implementation timetables 
were set for Ireland and the United Kingdom by size of undertaking/establishment.   
The other major piece of legislation adopted in 2002 seeking to extend some 
of the protection of the 1993 working time directive to mobile workers in the road 
transport industry (OJ L80/35 0f 23.3.2002) also dated from 1997 and had proved 
equally controversial. The sticking points here concerned, first, the definition of 
working time (in abortive negotiations between the  sectoral  social partners) and, 
second, the application of the agreement to self-employed drivers (when the process 
shifted to the Council). Compromises included the exemption of the latter from the 
terms of the agreement for the first four years of its application.
Apart from these two measures other adoptions during included legislation 
updating the 1976 equal treatment directive (OJ L269 of 5.10.2002), a directive 
amending 1980 legislation on the protection of employees in the event of insolvency 
of their employer (OJ L270 of 8.10.2002), and a physical agents health and safety 
directive that (OJ L177 of 6.7.2002) that had first been proposed in 1992.
The pace of legislation slowed further in 2003. Perhaps the main development 
was a measure on worker involvement in the new European Cooperative Society 
(Directive 2003/72/EC of 22.7.2003). There was also a piece of health and safety 
legislation concerning the protection of workers from risks related to exposure to 
asbestos at work (OJJ L97/48 of 15.4.2003) that amended legislation dating from 
1983.
14Social policy developments in 2004 and 2005 were overshadowed by the 
agreement in the European Council on the draft of the EU Constitutional Treaty and 
its rejection by two member states in referendums, respectively. We shall treat 
mid-2005 as the dividing line. This is inevitably somewhat arbitrary but it falls 
between the end of one Commission and the appointment of its successor in 
November 2004, the relaunching of the Lisbon strategy, and the fleshing out of a new 
social policy agenda.
2004 saw agreement on the text of the new Constitutional Treaty in June (see 
next section), preceded in May by the entry of 10 new nations into the EU. For its 
part, social policy focused largely on a takeover bids directive and several health and 
safety initiatives. The former legislation dealt with the information and consultation of 
workers,   or  their   representatives,   in   the  event  of   takeover   bids   (OJ   L142  of 
30.4.2004).   It   followed   on   unsuccessful   Commission   action   in   2001   and   the 
appointment of an expert group (of company law experts) to look into the question. 
The legislation requires that when a takeover offer bid is made public, the boards of 
the both companies must communicate it to the employees concerned or their 
representatives. The legislation thus stands alongside the EWC directive, the business 
transfers directive, the collective redundancies directive, and the most recent addition 
on national systems for informing and consulting workers.  The two pieces of health 
and safety legislation dealt with the protection of the workers from the risks arising 
from electromagnetic fields (OJ L184 of 24 May 2004) and exposure to carcinogens 
or   mutagens   (OL   L158   of   30.4.2004).   Relatedly,   the   social   partners   reached 
agreement on procedures to increase awareness and understanding of stress at work. 
The framework agreement, which will not on this occasion be implemented through a 
Council decision, tackles the identification, prevention and management of stress at 
work.  
  Although 2005 saw discussion in Council of a number of important and 
controversial themes – in particular, revisions of the 1993 working time directive, 
draft   legislation   regulating   the   working   conditions   of   temporary   workers,   and 
discussions linking revision of the EWC directive to industrial restructuring – very 
few pieces of legislation were enacted into law. That being said, the Lisbon strategy 
was relaunched in March 2004 (Commission, 2005a). Adopted legislation comprised 
a Council regulation governing the application of social security schemes to employed 
persons, self-employed persons and their families moving within the EU (OJ L117/1 
15of 4.5.2005), a proposal on cross border mergers (OJ 301/1 of 25.11.2005), and an 
agreement on working time for rail workers (OJ L195/15 of 27.7.2005). The first 
measure sought to update existing regulations on measures to facilitate labor mobility 
given   differences   in   member   states’   social   security   schemes   in   the   light   of 
developments in national legislation and European Court of Justice case law. The 
second sought to prevent any loss in worker participation in circumstances where at 
least one of the merging companies already practices such employee involvement. 
The final measure gave effect via a Council decision to an agreement earlier arrived at 
by the sectoral social partners.
As far as the Lisbon strategy was concerned, the backdrop to the relaunch 
(half-way through its life) was a highly critical retort on its operation by an expert 
group (Kok, 2004). The EU response was to renew the strategy according to three 
main strands: encouraging knowledge and innovation; making the Community an 
attractive area in which to invest and work; and encouraging greater social cohesion 
through growth and employment. No sacrifice of the European social model was 
implied.   Indeed,   under   the   third   heading,   the   new   social   agenda   set   by   the 
Commission was welcomed. That document, published earlier in 2005, states: “The 
added value of the Social Agenda is beyond doubt. The Agenda makes it possible to 
facilitate the modernization of national systems against the backdrop of far-reaching 
economic and social changes. It supports the harmonious operation of the single 
market   while   ensuring   respect   for   fundamental   rights   and   common 
values” (Commission, 2005b, p. 2). The two priorities set by the Commission were 
the achievement of full employment and a more cohesive society. Apart from a 
revamped EES, the former goal included “anticipating, triggering and managing” 
economic change. It also required  a “new dynamic for industrial relations,” involving 
changes in labor law, enhanced social dialogue, the promotion of corporate social 
responsibility, consolidation of the various provisions on worker information and 
consultation, and transnational collective bargaining as part of the partnership-for-
change priority. For its part, the requirements of a more cohesive society  involved the 
modernization of social protection, initiating the open method of coordination for 
health and long-term care, new initiatives on minimum income schemes, and further 
initiatives in the area if equal opportunities and antidiscrimination (including a new 
European gender institute). There was to be no retreat in the area of European social 
16policy.  Indeed, wider circumstances  seemed  to presage a deepening of policy 
activism.
Phase 5. The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, the Reform Treaty, 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The path toward major institutional reform of the treaties establishing the Community 
was opened up by the 2001 Treaty of Nice which became operational in 2003. The 
treaty established a number of institutional reforms
11  and the Nice Declaration 
annexed to that treaty called for a broad debate on the future of the European Union in 
the light of the impending accession of countries from eastern and southern Europe 
(10 in 2004 following the enabling Treaty of Athens, 2003, and a further 2 in 2007 via 
the Treaty of Luxembourg, 2005). The next steps in the process were the Laeken 
declaration of the European Council in December 2001, which set out the process by 
which a constitution could be arrived at, the European Convention which provided a 
rough draft document in July 2003, and the summit meeting of heads of state, acting 
as an intergovernmental conference, which accepted that constitution with some 
compromises in June 2004. 
As is well known, however, there were difficulties in ratifying the new 
constitutional treaty – it was rejected by voters in France and the Netherlands in 2005. 
The solution took the form of convening another intergovernmental conference to 
adopt a so-called Reform Treaty for the European Union.  The latter was agreed to on 
October 19, 2007 and formally signed on December 13, 2007. (Its formal title is the 
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union [i.e. Maastricht] and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community  [i.e. the Treaty of Rome].) As  is 
equally well known, much of the Constitutional Treaty carries over to the Reform 
Treaty. 
  This is true of the employment chapter and the eleven-element social policy 
provisions, including the rules on qualified majority voting (now extended to cover 
social security for migrant workers).
12  The main source of controversy as regards 
social policy concerns the so-called Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (OJ C364/1 of 18.12.2000). The Charter was first drawn up under the auspices 
of the Nice Treaty but at that time was only a (solemn) declaration that would not be 
legally binding on member states.  It is based on the Community Treaties themselves, 
International Conventions such as the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights 
17and the 1989 European Social Charter (considered earlier), as well as constitutional 
traditions common to the member states and various declarations of the European 
Parliament. Had the Constitutional Treaty passed muster, it would arguably have 
assumed central importance in the development of social policy since it was to be 
integrated into the treaty and thus legally binding. 
But the Charter is also incorporated into the Reform Treaty (“The Union 
recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the charter of Fundamental 
Rights of 7 December 2000 … which shall have the same legal value as the 
Treaties.”) and may be expected to influence EU regulations and directives. However, 
the United Kingdom secured a Protocol designed to prevent the application of the 
Charter by the European Court of Justice. Article 1 of the Protocol states: “The 
Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice, or any court or tribunal of 
[Poland or of] the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions, practices or action [of Poland or] of the United Kingdom are inconsistent 
with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirm. In particular, and 
for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights 
applicable to [Poland or] the United Kingdom except in so far as [Poland and] the 
United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.” Article 2 states: “To 
the extent that a provision of the Charter refers to national laws and practices, it shall 
only apply to [Poland or] the United Kingdom to the extent that the rights and 
principles that it contains are recognized in the law or practices of [Poland or] the 
United Kingdom.”
Nevertheless, it is moot whether the British opt out will succeed. At issue, 
then, is whether the redlining  will be a sufficient safeguard to prevent court 
interpretation of the charter forcing a change in British laws. Given the elevated status 
of social policy (at the expense of free and undistorted competition) in the Reform 
treaty, the European Court of Justice may be expected to rule in favor of social rights 
when these clash with the needs of competition. It is entirely possible that safeguards 
may be expected to leak (some would allege like a sieve) because the Charter is 
subject to case law. Thus, for example, individuals from other member states working 
in Britain might seek to use the Charter in defense or a British company outside of the 
U.K. might raise the Charter in litigation.  In any event, this episode revisits instances 
of earlier British opt-outs and invites comparison:  any multipspeed Europe that 
emerges is unlikely to persist. 
18The social and economic contents of the Charter are contained in four 
chapters.
13  The first is  Dignity, where Article 5.2 proclaims that no one shall be 
required to perform forced or compulsory labor.  The second is Freedom, where for 
example Article 12.1 provides that “everyone has the right to freedom of … 
association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which 
implies that everyone has the right to join unions for the protection of his or her 
interests.” The third is Equality, where among other clauses Article 23 provides that 
“equality   between   men   and   women   must   be   ensured   in   all   areas   including 
employment, work and pay” and “that the principle of equality shall not prevent the 
maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favor of the 
under-represented sex.” The fourth chapter is Solidarity which covers worker rights to 
timely information and consultation (Article 27), the right of collective bargaining and 
industrial action (Article 28), protection against unfair dismissal (Article 30), safe 
working conditions that are subject to maximum working hours, rest periods, and 
annual paid leave (Article 31), the prohibition of child labor and the protection of 
young people at work (Article 32), legal, economic and social protection of the family 
unit (Article 33), and an entitlement to social security benefits and social assistance 
(Article 34).  The potential scope for the extension of social policy is thus material. 
Given the hiatus over the Constitutional Treaty, and the appointment of a new 
Commission, however, it is not surprising that legislation processed through the EU 
decision-making process has been light. During 2006 the measures encompass a piece 
of consolidating equal opportunities legislation (OJ L204/23 of 26.7.2006),
14  a 
directive to protect workers from exposure to optical radiation (OJ L114/3 of 
27.4.2006), action to harmonize social legislation in road transport (OJ L102/1 of 
1.4.2006), and a regulation on the registration, authorization, and restriction of 
chemicals (REACH).
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For its part, the first half of 2007 saw no significant legislation adopted and 
even less in the way of new proposals. Apart from an  autonomous  framework 
agreement between the social partners on harassment and violence at work at work, 
there were no adoptions and just one new proposal seeking to sanction employers of 
illegal immigrants from outside the EU (COM(2007) 249 final). No agreement could 
be reached on a draft directive on the portability of supplementary pension rights 
(COM(2005) 0507) and no progress was made on the draft directive on working 
conditions for temporary agency workers (OJ C203/1 of 27.8.2002; COM(2002) 
190701) and  the revision of the working time directive (first adopted in 1993 and thence 
consolidated in Directive 2003/88/EC) (see COM(204) 0607; COM(2005) 0246).
Somewhat   greater   progress   was   made   in   the  second   half   of   the   year. 
Abstracting from one piece of health and safety legislation (namely, a directive 
rationalizing the regular reports that member states are required to make on the 
practical application of a number of health and safety at work directives; see OJ L165 
of 27.6.2007), there was some action on the draft directives on agency work and 
working time – dormant since October 2004 and deadlocked in Council since 
November 2006, respectively. As regards the former, exceptions from equal treatment 
in pay and conditions for temporary workers in relation to regular workers employed 
by the user undertaking were introduced together with the maximum length of 
assignment over which such exceptions could apply. As regards the latter, the 
stumbling block of the individual opt-out from the maximum average working time of 
48 hours was met by preserving the possibility of the opt-out but with safeguards to 
protect workers’ health and safety from excessive hours (e.g. some weekly hours limit 
would have to be set for workers who agreed to an opt-out and the national authorities 
would have to monitor its use). Despite the device of the two drafts being linked with 
the aim of finding a balance between the two, in neither case, however, was a decision 
reached in Council. 
There was also action on the draft directive on the portability of pensions. 
While no political agreement could be reached in Council, the sole issue yet to be 
decided in what is accepted to be a much watered-down directive hinges on the 
vesting period that triggers entitlement to a supplementary pension (COM(2005) 
0507; COM(2007) 603 final).
New proposals initiated during the latter half of 2007 included two directives 
on labor migration  from outside the EU encompassing  a common  application 
procedure/set of rights for such workers (COM(207) 638 final), and new procedures 
for the admission and residence of highly qualified immigrants (COM(2007) 637 
final). Finally, the Commission also launched consultation over the transfer of 
undertakings directive (2001/23/EC) to deal with the issue of transfers that involved a 
change in the place of work, concluded its (abortive) discussions with the social 
partners on improving workers’ protection against musculoskeletal disorders at work, 
and continued the consultation process in respect of the integration of disadvantaged 
groups into the labour market. 
20As far as 2008 is concerned, votes are likely on the agency temporary work, 
working time, and pensions directives, all foreshadowed in the Commission’s work 
program for 2008 (see Commission, 2008). In addition, debate will begin on the 
various labor migration draft directives. Further themes from the action program 
include the revision of the 1994 directive on EWCs, amendments to the 1992 pregnant 
workers’ directive and the 2001 transfer of undertakings directive, two new pieces of 
legislation on non-EU labor migration (concerning transferees/trainees and seasonal 
workers, and a European Private Company Statute covering small and medium-sized 
firms. 
Although these are nontrivial measures, revisions of existing legislation 
dominate new legislative proposals, as has been true for some years now. In 
particular, little dramatic is expected from modernizing employment legislation where 
flexicurity currently involves little more at present than a tissue of themes (see 
Commission,   2007).   But,  as  we  have  indicated  throughout,  intervals  of  thin 
legislative are part and parcel of the evolution of social policy.
III. A Summing Up
Having traced the development of social policy in the European Union from its 
origins in the early 1970s to the present time, there can be little doubt that it has come 
of age, even to the extent of enjoying the same status of the goal of economic 
integration in the European endeavor. There is now an unambiguous treaty basis for 
social policy and now arguably, via the Charter, an extension of social policy 
provisions.  Yet even without such support, earlier Commissions have been able to 
secure much of their basic agenda and in the process create a veritable web of rules 
governing the employment relation, as well as a set of constituencies favoring further 
social  legislation.  Even   unemployment   crises,  while  in one sense  constraining 
Commission activism, have also provided opportunities – witness the rolling action 
program referred to earlier – and the occasion to insert a new aspect of social policy 
into the treaties establishing the community (viz. the employment chapter).
We would argue that the Commission has been single minded in pursuit of the 
social dimension and that its dogged persistence has paid off. This is not to say that 
the path of legislation has been smooth – the evidence is indeed to the contrary – or 
that the Commission has achieved all of its goals in those mandates that have been 
21enacted.  But there is more than one way of skinning a cat and the Commission has 
proved adept in addressing such issues (and in choosing its moment) through other 
instruments, albeit at the price of overlapping and at times seemingly inconsistent 
legislation. And, as have seen, the Commission has often revisited its mandates (often 
with minimal analysis of their consequences), and unsurprisingly the adjustment of 
the terms and conditions has been upward.  
But if the basis for social policy is much stronger in the wake of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice, and the Reform Treaty, the course of policy is likely 
to be much messier than before. This is partly the result of the open method of 
coordination and soft law in delivering the social policy alongside though certainly 
not substituting for the Community Method of directives and regulations (however 
these are redesignated). Another reason is the piecemeal actions of the social partners 
in formulating some policies and accommodating to others. Yet another reason is that 
the Commission is now seeking a framework of new labor standards appropriate to 
the   information   society,   introducing   an   intergenerational   approach   to   policy, 
suggesting a new dynamic for industrial relations, and so on. 
Given the large number of Community instruments already in place (by no 
means all which have been identified here), it would be reassuring if there were a firm 
economic basis for policy and some accounting of the effects of the measures in place. 
As is well known, while recognizing that economic efficiency is not the sole 
justification for policy, a prima facie case for mandates can be based on specific 
instances of market failure. Thus, both information asymmetries and externalities can 
be deployed to support a worker participation mandate, and an information failures 
argument to help sustain health and safety initiatives). As a practical matter, the 
Commission has not relied on such specific arguments, and it has tended to paint with 
much broader brush typically invoking notions of distortions of competition and 
social   dumping.   Latterly,   with   disappointing   economic   aggregates,   these   have 
admittedly given way to notions of “unity in diversity” attendant upon the soft acquis 
and the open method of coordination. But this is to deny the Community Method and 
in itself is no excuse for not undertaking efficiency audits. The device of appointing 
expert groups has proven no such guarantee and more often than not has seemed to 
have provided new headings for new lines of policy. 
There is nothing in any of this to deny the usefulness of the search for an 
alternative to the U.S. model. Arguably, truly embracing a soft acquis might permit 
22the emergence of a viable European social space. But there is no real sign in the 
developments charted here that the Commission has given up on advanced social 
engineering or abandoned the one-size-fits all approach. This is turn raises an 
interesting research question. With the Europeanization of labor law in all countries of 
the EU, can deteriorations in competitiveness rankings be observed for those countries 
(most obviously the United Kingdom) that have had to travel the furthest in 
accommodating to the Rhineland model?
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23Endnotes
1. Article 117 sets the goal of improved working conditions and an improved standard 
of  living   for  workers  so   as   to   maker   possible   their   harmonization   while  the 
improvement is being maintained. It notes that such a development will not solely be 
achieved through the functioning of the common market but also from the provisions 
of the Rome treaty. Article 100 is one such provision. It states that: “The Council 
shall, acting unanimously on a proposal by the Commission, issue directives for the 
approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation, and administrative 
action in the member states as directly affects the establishment or functioning of the 
common market.”
2. Full references to the actual legislation as well as the abortive legislation noted in 
the next paragraph are contained in Addison and Siebert (1991) and Addison (2001).
3. Note that the new treaty contained a new title on economic and social cohesion, 
while also initiating a process of social dialogue (see below). At the same time, the 
SEA also introduced the cooperation procedure which increased somewhat the role of 
the European Parliament in matters covered by QMV.
4. The Treaty also increased the authority of the European Parliament somewhat 
beyond the cooperation procedure. Under a new codecision procedure, the Parliament 
could for the first time veto legislation at the second reading stage. If the Parliament 
decides to amend a proposal and the Council cannot accept the amendments, a joint 
compromise must be agreed through the agency of a conciliation procedure. Note that 
at this time only the posted workers directive was covered by the new procedure.  
5. The Agreement also identifies areas that lie outside its competence: legislation on 
pay, the right to strike/lockout, and the right of association.
6. UNICE was renamed BusinessEurope/the Confederation of European Business in 
January 2007. Earlier, the number of social partners at cross-industry level had grown 
to four when in December 1998 the European Association of Craft, Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises (UEAMPE) reached an agreement with BusineesEurope 
allowing it to take part in the social dialogue process. 
7. Namely, on the issue of the burden of proof in sex discrimination cases (OJ L14 of 
20.1.98) and on combating sexual harassment at work.
8. We note that the first agreement negotiated under the sectoral social dialogue was 
concluded in September 1998 on the organization of working time of seafarers, 
representing an extension of the 1993 working time directive (see Phase 1) to sectors 
and activities excluded by that directive (OJ L167 of 2.7.99).
9. Apart from closing two-track social Europe, the main change introduced by the 
treaty was the extension of the scope of the  codecision procedure  and hence an 
increase in the authority of the European Parliament. It also to confuse matters 
renumbered all the Treaty articles.
 
2410. In addition the Commission adopted a directive to give legal effect to the social 
partners’ agreement on working time in the maritime sector (OJ L167/33 of 2.7.99) 
and sought  a mechanism  for the compliance of ships of all flags with this directive.
11. The main changes introduced by Nice had to do with limiting the size and 
composition of the Commission, extending QMV, and establishing a new weighting 
of votes in Council. 
12. These social policy provisions are as follows: (a) improvements in particular of 
the   working   environment   to   protect   workers’   health   and   safety;   (b)   working 
conditions; (c) social security and social protection of workers; (d) protection of 
workers where their employment contract is terminated; (e) the information and 
consultation of workers; (f) representation and collective defense of the interests of 
workers, including codetermination (although not in the areas of pay, the right of 
association, the right to strike, or the right to impose lock-outs); (g) conditions of 
employment for third-country nationals legally resident in the EU; (h) the integration 
of persons excluded from the labor market; (i) equality between men and women with 
regard to labor market opportunities and treatment at work; (j) the combating of social 
exclusion; and (k) the modernization of social protection systems. Note that the Treaty 
of Nice extended QMV where the Council decides to apply the codecision procedure 
in respect of items (d),(f), and (g) that would otherwise subject to unanimity.  
 
13. The other chapters cover citizens’ rights, justice, and general provisions.
14. The equal opportunities legislation seeks to improve legal clarity and certainty and 
to reflect two decades of ECJ case law. It consolidates 7 existing directives covering 
equal pay, equal treatment as regards access to employment, vocational training, and 
promotion, and working conditions, equal treatment in occupational social security 
schemes, and the burden of proof in sex discrimination cases.
15. I do not comment on the services directive as it seeks to legislate not on 
employment matters but rather to remove obstacles to the freedom of establishment 
for service providers and the free movement of services between member states of the 
EU (Directive 2006/123/EC; OJ L376/36 of 27.12.2006).
16. See, for example, the ‘burdens barometer’ of the British Chambers of Commerce 
(http://www.britishchambers.org.uk/policy/pdf/budens_bar2006.pdf).   See   also   the 
regulatory impact assessments of the U.K. Department for Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform (http://www.berr.gov.uk/consultations/ria/index.html)
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